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Quantum data locking is a quantum communication primitive that allows the use of a short
secret key to encrypt a much longer message. It guarantees information-theoretical security against
an adversary with limited quantum memory. Here we present a quantum data locking protocol
that employs pseudo-random circuits consisting of Clifford gates only, which are much easier to
implement fault tolerantly than universal gates. We show that information can be encrypted into
n-qubit code words using order n − Hmin(X) secret bits, where Hmin(X) is the min-entropy of the
plain text, and a min-entropy smaller than n accounts for information leakage to the adversary. As
an application, we discuss an efficient method for encrypting the output of a quantum computer.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum data locking (QDL) is a quantum phe-
nomenon that allows us to encrypt a long message us-
ing a much shorter secret key with information theoretic
security. This yields one of the strongest violations of
classical information theory in quantum physics. In fact,
a classic result by Shannon [1], which is at the root of
the one-time pad encryption, establishes that informa-
tion theoretic encryption of a message of n bits requires
a private key of no less than n bits.
The first QDL protocol was introduced by DiVincenzo
et al. [2] who showed that a single secret bit is suffi-
cient to obfuscate half of the information contained in n
bits, for any n. This was obtained by encoding n bits of
classical information into n qubits, where the one bit of
information determines which of two mutually unbiased
bases is used. Any attempt to measure the n-qubit cipher
text without knowledge of the basis allows one to obtain
at most n/2 bits of information. Further works have
strengthened this seminal result [3–8]. The strongest
QDL protocols can encrypt n bits of information using
an exponentially small private key, with the guarantee
that no more than ǫn bits will leak to the adversary.
QDL was discussed in the context of quantum communi-
cations in Refs. [9–11], applications to secret key expan-
sion and direct secret communication were introduced in
Refs. [12–14], and proof-of-principle demonstrations were
presented in Refs. [15, 16].
In a typical QDL protocol, a short private key is used
to secretly agree on a code, for example a set of basis
vectors, to encode classical information into a quantum
system. To encrypt information, the sender (Alice) ap-
plies a unitary transformation to map the computational
basis into the chosen basis. To decrypt, the legitimate re-
ceiver (Bob) applies the inverse transformation, followed
by a measurement in the computational basis. This is
schematically shown in Fig. 1. In order to achieve secure
encryption, we require that only a negligible amount of
information is obtained by a non-authorized user (Eve)
who attempts to measure the quantum cipher text with-
out knowing the private key. The security of QDL holds














FIG. 1. Circuit layout for the encryption protocol. A use-
ful state |x〉 is concatenated with the encryption, a pseudo-
random quantum circuit Ck. The authorised User applies the
unitary c−1
k
and correctly decrypts the encryption. An unau-
thorized User/adversary can attempt to extract information
by performing an arbitrary measurement.
may have unlimited computational power, as long as they
have limited quantum memory. For example, Eve may
have no quantum memory, or a quantum memory with
bounded storage time [10, 12, 17]. For applications in
quantum cryptography, this puts QDL in the framework
of bounded quantum storage [18].
We show that pseudo-random circuits can be used to
build QDL protocols that are fault tolerant and robust
against information leakage. In particular, we show that
QDL can be realised efficiently using only Clifford gates,
which can be made fault tolerant much more easily than
the full universal gate set [19]. We assume that the users
have the ability to apply the non-universal set of Clifford
gates in a fault-tolerant way. We also assume that the
sender can prepare states in the computational basis of
n qubits, and the receiver can apply projective measure-
ments in the computational basis. As an application, we
argue that our QDL scheme can be used to encrypt the
output of a quantum computer, in such a way that it
is accessible only by authorised users. This encryption
is secure in a scenario where quantum computing is a
mature technology but quantum memories are not yet
perfect.

























review the framework of quantum data locking and intro-
duce our protocol. In Sec. III we discuss the properties of
random qubit circuits. We present our security analysis
in Sec. IV, which is followed by our results in Sec. V. We
discuss in detail the application of QDL to securing the
output of a quantum computation in Sec. VI.
II. QUANTUM DATA LOCKING
Our scheme develops along the lines of previous QDL
protocols. The protocol involves the legitamate sender
Alice and the receiver Bob. The adversary is called Eve.
In QDL, one may distinguish two security scenarios. In
weak QDL, one assumes that Alice and Bob communi-
cates through a noisy quantum channel, and Eve mea-
sures the environment of the channel. This is formally
described by saying that Eve has access to the output of
the conjugate channel of the channel from Alice to Bob.
In strong QDL, one instead assumes that Eve can access
the output of both the channel from Alice to Bob and
its conjugate. Here we work in the strong QDL scenario.
Furthermore, we consider the case when the channel from
Alice to Bob is noiseless. The extension to noisy channels
is still an open problem in the general case, with excep-
tion of a handful of examples of noisy channels, including
the erasure channel and the loss channel [11–14].
The QDL protocol is as follows
1. Alice and Bob share a unconditionally secure secret
key of logK bits.
2. They publicly agree upon a set of K n-qubit cir-
cuits, {Ck}k=1,...,K . These circuits are composed
of Clifford gates only.
3. Alice encodes the n-bit message x into the quan-
tum state |x〉, which belongs to the n-qubit com-
putational basis.
4. She then encrypts the code word and sends it to
Bob. The encryption is realised by applying the
Clifford circuit corresponding to the unique uni-
tary Ck associated with the private key. Thus, the
encrypted code word is Ck|x〉.
5. Bob, who knows the private key, applies C−1k , de-
crypts the code word Ck|x〉, and measures in the
computational basis.
Alice can chose one among M = 2n possible code
words. If they have same prior probability, then the code
book has maximal entropy of exactly n bits. If the code
words do not have equal probabilities, then it is conve-
nient to quantify the entropy of the code book using the
min-entropy [20]












ǫn n+ log n+ log(1/ǫ2) Haar
Ref. [3] ǫn+ 3 3 log n Haar





TABLE I. Summary of key size and circuit requirement for
different schemes for encrypting the information encoded in
n qubits.
where pmax := maxx pX(x). A min-entropy smaller than
n does also describes a situation where some information
about the plain text has leaked to Eve.
The security of QDL is established in a specific setting
where the adversary has limited quantum storage capa-
bility. For example, Eve may have no reliable quantum
memory and thus she is forced to measure the quantum
state as soon as she obtains it [10]. QDL may also be
secure if Eve can store quantum information reliably for
a limited time, and Alice and Bob have an upper bound
on her memory time [12, 17] 1.
A number of QDL protocols and security proofs have
been discussed in literature. Some of them, however,
would be limited to the case where Hmin(X) = n
[3, 5, 6, 12, 13]. For example, Fawzi et al. [5, 6] showed
an explicit and efficient construction that can encrypt
n bits of information using a key of O(log (n) log (n/ǫ))
bits, with a leakage of no more than ǫn bits. However,
this construction cannot be made fault-tolerant [5]. The
approach of Dupuis et al. [7] can instead account for non-
maximal min-entropy, and would yield results similar to
this work, but it relies on sampling unitaries from the
Haar distribution, which requires an exponential number
of gates [21]. In contrast, here we are using an approxi-
mate 2-design, which can be sampled using Clifford gates
only. Finally, the analysis of partial information leakage
was also considered in Refs. [22] as well as in Ref. [7],
however the scheme of Ref. [22] may be hard to realize
in a fault tolerant way.
Table I shows a summary of some previously known
1If Eve has a memory with a finite time, this weakens the security
of the protocol, as she may obtain side information during the
storage time, and then leverage it to gain more knowledge about the
encrypted computation. Past works have addressed this issue in a
quantitative way, assuming a model of quantum memory as a noisy
channel that decoheres in time [? ]. This approach may be used
to quantify the security as a function of the time elapsed between
when Eve receives the quantum state and when she measures it.
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QDL protocol, compared to the contribution of this pa-
per, the quantum one-time pad [23], and the approximate
quantum one-time pad [3].
III. PSEUDO-RANDOM QUANTUM CIRCUITS
Unlike other works, which have considered the uniform
ensemble of random unitaries induced by the Haar mea-
sure (see e.g., [3, 5, 6]), here we apply pseudo-random
unitaries from an approximate 2-design. This ensemble of
unitaries has also been used in other applications related
to information obfuscation, most notably system decou-
pling [24]. Using genuine Haar-random unitaries provides
slightly more efficient security. However, as pointed out
in Ref. [27], using unitaries from the Haar measure is
prohibitively inefficient for large systems due to the ex-
ponential number of two-qubit gates and random bits
required.
Recall that, given a Hilbert space of dimensions d and
δ > 0, a δ-approximate t-design is an ensemble of unitary
operators C such that [25–27]




≤ (1 + δ)Mℓ , (2)
for all unit vectors |α〉 and |β〉 in d dimensions and ℓ ≤ t,






is the ℓ-th moment of the uniform distribution induced
by the Haar measure, i.e., Mℓ = EHaar[|〈α|C|β〉|
2ℓ].
Given an n-qubit circuit, a δ-approximate 2-design can
be achieved with O(n(n + log 1/δ)) two-qubit Clifford
gates [28], or O(n log2 n) random U(4) gates [21]. There
are known codes that implement the Clifford group in
a fault-tolerant manner [19, 29], whereas supplementing
the Clifford group with fault tolerant gates into a univer-
sal set of gates is highly non-trivial [41].
The first two moments of the pesudo-random unitaries



















quantifies the spread of the random variable |〈α|C|β〉|2
around its average. For δ-approximate 2-designs we can








This coefficient will play a fundamental role in our analy-
sis of QDL. We will use the above bound on γ to estimate
the length of the private key.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Our security analysis builds on, improves, and gener-
alises techniques previously applied in Refs. [12, 13, 30].
Different code words correspond to different quantum
states that Alice can prepare, denoted as |x〉 (with x =
1, ...,M). These vectors are mutually orthogonal. For
example, these states can be the vectors in the n-qubit
computational basis. Different code words may have dif-
ferent prior probabilities, denoted as pX(x). Therefore,
the prior uncertainty in the code words is well quantified
by the min-entropy Hmin(X) = − logmaxx pX(x).
From the point of view of the legitimate receiver Bob,
who knows the private key, the a priori description of






pX(x) |x〉 〈x| . (6)
The description of this state is different for Eve, who does













Below we show that, if K is large enough, then Eve can
obtain only a negligible amount of information about the
code words by measuring ρE .
Like other works on QDL [2, 3, 10, 12, 13, 30, 31],
we use the accessible information Iacc(X;E) to quantify
the potential information leakage to Eve. This quantity
represents the maximum number of bits of information
about the input variable X that can be obtained from a
measurement of the state ρE . We anticipate that similar
results could be obtained using other metrics, see e.g.,
[5, 6, 8].
A measurement is a map ME→Y that takes the quan-
tum system E as input and has the classical variable Y
as output. For any given measurement, one can consider
the mutual information I(X;Y) between the input mes-
sage and the measurement output. Recall that the mu-
tual information between two random variables X and
Y is I(X;Y) = H(Y) − H(Y|X), where H(Y|X) is the
conditional Shannon entropy. The mutual information
vanishes when X and Y are statistically independent and
reaches its maximum when they are perfectly correlated.





where the maximization is over all possible measurements
ME→Y. We require that the accessible information is
sufficiently small, i.e., that the information leaking to Eve
is negligible not just for one particular measurement, but
for all possible measurements she can perform.
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The security analysis of the protocol relies on show-
ing that Iacc(X;E) can be made arbitrarily small if K is
large enough. This also allows us to quantify the minimal
length of the private key to ensure secure encryption. To
show this, we first write the accessible information as the




and then show that H(Y) ≃ H(Y|X) for all measure-
ments ME→Y. The proof shows that for a random choice
of K unitaries, and for K large enough, one obtains
Iacc(X;E) ≤ 2nǫ with probability arbitrarily close to 1.
In general, the measurement map ME→Y is char-
acterised by POVM elements Λy, such that Λy ≥ 0,
∑
y Λy = I. It is known that the optimal measurement
has unit rank [2], i.e., the POVM elements take the form
Λy = αy|φy〉〈φy|, where φy are unit vectors, and αy are
positive numbers such that
∑
y αy = 2
n.
The outcomes of the measurement are distributed ac-
cording to the probability distribution
pY(y) = αy 〈φy|ρE |φy〉 , (10)
with ρE as given in Eq. (7). For given x, the conditional
probability of a measurement outcome is
pY|X=x(y) = αy 〈φy|ρ
x







































The security proof proceeds by showing that, by in-
creasingK, both pY and pY|X=x concentrate towards their
common expectation value, and that the probability of
a deviation larger than ǫ is exponentially suppressed.
Therefore both the entropy H(Y) and the conditional
entropy H(Y|X) will approach the same value. We show
that both terms in the curly brackets in Eq. (13) are
arbitrarily close to
〈φy|ρ̄E |φy〉 log 〈φy|ρ̄E |φy〉 (14)




is the n-qubit maximally mixed state. The relative minus
sign between the terms then implies that I(X;Y) can be
made arbitrarily small.
First, we show, using the matrix Chernoff bound [32],
that ρE is close to the n-qubit maximally mixed state
ρ̄E := 2
−n
I. Assuming K is large enough, with near unit
probability we have
ρE ≤ (1 + ǫ)ρ̄E = (1 + ǫ)2
−n
I . (16)
From this inequality we find that 〈φ |ρE |φ〉 ≤ (1+ ǫ)2
−n
uniformly in φ. For a random choice of the unitaries, the
probability that this inequality is violated is smaller than










Next, we apply a tail bound due to A. Maurer [33]. We
show that, for given φ and x,
〈φ|ρxE |φ〉 ≥ (1− ǫ)〈φ|ρ̄E |φ〉 . (18)
This inequality needs to be extended to all code words
and to (almost) all values of x. In this way we obtain
that, for a random choice of the unitaries, the inequality

















where γ has been defined in Eq. (4) (see Appendix B for
details).










−n = 1, we finally find
I(X;Y) ≤ 2ǫn . (21)
This bound on the accessible information holds proba-
bilistically, but the likelihood of failure can be made ar-
bitrary small for large enough K. Specifically, the prob-
ability of failure is no larger than P1 + P2. Therefore, it




















We have shown that for a random choice of K uni-
tary transformations, the accessible information is upper
bounded by a negligible number of bits 2nǫ,
Iacc(X;E) ≤ 2nǫ . (23)
From Eq. (22), this holds for a private key of length
logK = log γ + n−Hmin(X) +O(log n) +O(log 1/ǫ) .
(24)
Note that the secret key length depends on the coefficient
γ introduced in Eq. (4). For an approximate 2-design
using the bound in Eq. (5), we obtain
logK ≤ n−Hmin(X) + log
1 + δ
(1− δ)2
+O(log n) +O(log 1/ǫ) .
(25)
In conclusions, we have shown that QDL achieves se-
cure encryption using order n − Hmin(X) secret bits,
where Hmin(X) is the min-entropy of the code words sent
by Alice. We plot Eq. (25) in Fig. (2), where the ex-
act value of K is given by Eq. (22), for ǫ = 10−8 and
different values of Hmin. In the figure, we also compare
our protocol with other private-key cryptography meth-
ods based on the quantum one-time pad as well as its
approximate version [3]. Our protocol is more efficient,
in terms of the length of the private key, when n ' 50,
and the advantage increases with increasing n.
VI. APPLICATION: SECURING THE OUTPUT
OF A QUANTUM COMPUTER
Applications of QDL have been mostly focused on
quantum communication. Previous works have applied
QDL, for example, to communication through a wire-
tapped channel. Here, we propose the use of pseudo-
random quantum circuits as efficient encryption devices
for protecting the output of a quantum computer. This













Quantum one-time pad 




FIG. 2. Number of secret bits (logK in Eq. (22)) required to
lock an n-qubit output of a quantum computer, for ǫ = 10−8
and different values of Hmin: Hmin = n (red solid line), 0.8n
(green dotted-dashed line) and 0.6n (blue dotted line). For
comparison, we plot the approximate state-randomization in
Ref. [3] (purple dashed line with circles), and the quantum


















Decryption by legitimate 
or unauthorized user  
FIG. 3. Circuit layout for the encryption protocol. A useful
computation U is concatenated with the encryption, a pseudo-
random quantum circuit C. The authorised User applies the
unitary V = C† and correctly decrypts the encryption. An
unauthorized User/adversary can attempt to extract informa-
tion by performing an arbitrary measurement.
application assumes a scenario where quantum comput-
ing is a mature technology but quantum memories are
not yet perfect.
We imagine quantum computers as devices servicing
many distributed users, where the latter may have lim-
ited computing capability, or may not know the algo-
rithm that is realised by the server. In this scenario, we
anticipate the need to encrypt the output of a quantum
computer. To realise this task, we consider a protocol for
private-key encryption between a quantum computer and
its authorised user. This is schematically shown in Fig. 3.
Unlike blind quantum computation [34–37], which is con-
cerned with untrusted hardware and verification, our goal
is to prevent unauthorised users from gaining access to
the quantum computer’s output.
Otherwise, one could encrypt the quantum state |ψ〉
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before the measurement. Perfect encryption obtained
with the quantum one-time pad would require a secret
key of 2n bits [3]. Approximate encryption, one that en-
crypts the quantum state up to ǫ probability of failure,
would instead require a secret key of O(n) + O(log 1/ǫ)
bits [3, 4]. These protocols require that the encrypted
state be virtually indistinguishable from the maximally
mixed state. Expressed in terms of the trace norm,
‖ρ−2−n1 ‖ ≤ ǫ, for some small ǫ. However, the output of
a quantum computation typically contains the answer to
a meaningful question. For our purposes, we may simply
require that an unauthorised user does not obtain the
correct answer. This opens the possibility of performing
the encryption in a much more efficient way.
Suppose the quantum computer is used to solve a
particular problem whose solution space has cardinal-
ity M . Different outputs of the quantum computation
correspond to different quantum states, denoted as |x〉
(with x = 1, ...,M). We develop our analysis within the
subspace of fault-tolerant computation that incorporates
quantum error correction [38–40]. Therefore, the states
|x〉 are assumed to be quantum error-corrected. For ex-
ample, during transmission of the quantum state, channel
loss will erase a subset of the transmitted qubits. Our
protocol allows us to include a redundant encoding to
mitigate these losses. As long as the error correction is
successful, we know that there is no quantum information
leakage, and our protocol remains secure.
We further assume that different outputs are associ-
ated with a prior probability pX(x), and that the output
states |x〉 are mutually orthogonal. Therefore, the un-
certainty in the measurement outcome is well quantified
by the min-entropy Hmin(X) = − logmaxx pX(x). Note
that this is the prior distribution of the expected out-
come of the computation. The value of the min-entropy
depends on the particular computation performed by the
quantum computer, and it is easy to find examples where
Hmin is low and where it is high. For example, a parity
calculation may have a min-entropy as low as 1, whereas
a Grover search may have a min-entropy that is close to
maximal.
QDL is particularly efficient when Hmin(X) ∼ n, this
corresponds to the setting when one has little informa-
tion about the outcome of the computation. In this case
n−Hmin(X) can be substantially smaller than n, suggest-
ing that the encryption can be implemented much more
efficiently than previously thought.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
QDL is a communication primitive that allows us to
encrypt, with information theoretic security, a long mes-
sage with a much shorter private key. This is impossible
in classical information theory, where the key needs to be
at least as long as the message. When classical informa-
tion is encoded in a quantum system, the phenomenon of
QDL allows for secure encryption against an adversary
with limited quantum memory, but unbounded compu-
tational power.
In this paper, we have presented a new scheme for
QDL that employs pseudo-random unitaries for informa-
tion scrambling. These unitary transformations belong
to an approximate unitary 2-design. In particular, the
unitaries can be obtained by combining Clifford gates.
This is an improvement with respect to previous QDL
schemes, as fault-tolerant Clifford gates require orders
of magnitude fewer physical qubits than universal fault-
tolerant quantum computing [41, 42]. Furthermore, our
QDL protocol allows for partial information leakage to
the eavesdropper. This is modeled by the code words
having a non-maximal min-entropy.
We discuss an application of our QDL protocol as a
way to encrypt the output of a quantum computer. Un-
like blind quantum computation, which is concerned with
untrusted hardware and verification, we focus on pre-
venting unauthorised users gaining access to the output
of a quantum algorithm. We have considered a scenario
where a server can realise fault-tolerant universal quan-
tum computing, the user is capable only of implement-
ing fault-tolerant Clifford gates and measurements in the
computational basis, and the eavesdropper has limited
quantum memory.
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Appendix A: Application of the matrix Chernoff
bound
The matrix Chernoff bound states the following (which
can be obtained directly from Theorem 19 of Ref. [32]):
Theorem 1 Let {Xt}t=1,...,K be K i.i.d. d-dimensional
Hermitian-matrix-valued random variables, with Xt ∼

























where Pr{x} denotes the probability that the propo-
sition x is true, and D[u‖v] = u ln (u/v) − (1 −
u) ln [(1− u)/(1− v)].
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Note that these operators satisfy 0 ≤ Xk ≤ pmax :=


















k = ρU′ ,
(A4)
and E[X] = ρ̄U′ = 2
−n





































the following matrix inequality holds:
ρU′ ≤ (1 + ǫ)2
−n . (A8)
Appendix B: Application of the Maurer bound
We apply a concentration inequality obtained by Maurer
in Ref. [33]:
Theorem 2 Let {Xk}k=1,...,K be K i.i.d. non-negative
real-valued random variables, with Xk ∼ X and finite
first and second moments, E[X],E[X2] < ∞. Then, for






























U′ |φ〉 , (B3)
and
E[X] = ρ̄U′ = 2
−n
I . (B4)
The application of the Maurer tail bound then yields
Pr
{










with γ as defined in Eq. (4).
The probability bound in Eq. (B5) refers to one given
value of x. Here we extend it to ℓ < M distinct values
x1, x2, . . . , xℓ. We have
Pr
{
∀x = x1, x2, . . . xℓ, 〈φ|ρ
x










This follows from two observations. First, for different
values of x, the random variables 〈φ|ρx
U′
|φ〉 are identi-
cally distributed. Second, these variables are not statis-






|φ〉 = c ≤ 1. If the ℓ random vari-
ables x1, x2, . . . , xℓ were statistically independent, then
Eq. (B6) would hold. However, Eq. (B6) still holds be-
cause the normalization constraint implies that the vari-
ables are anti-correlated. Therefore, the probability that
they are all small is smaller than if they were statistically
independent.
We now extend the concentration inequality to all pos-





events. Applying the union bound we obtain
Pr
{
∃x1, x2, . . . xℓ, | ∀x = x1, x2, . . . xℓ, 〈φ|ρ
x




























|φ〉 ≥ (1− τ)2−n for at least M − ℓ values
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 (1− τ)2−n log (1− τ)2−n , (B8)






pX(x) ≥ 1− ℓpmax , (B9)






U′ |φ〉 log 〈φ|ρ
x
U′ |φ〉 ≤ (1− ℓ pmax) (1− τ)2
−n log (1− τ)2−n ≤ − (1− ℓ pmax) (1− τ)2
−nn . (B10)






U′ |φ〉 log 〈φ|ρ
x
U′ |φ〉 ≤ (1− τ)
22−nn = (1− 2τ)2−nn+O(τ2) . (B11)
To extend to all vectors φ, we exploit the notion of δ-net and closely follows Ref. [3]. In this way we obtain
Pr
{
∀φ, ∃x1, x2, . . . xℓ, | ∀x = x1, x2, . . . xℓ, 〈φ|ρ
x
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